This paper challenges cross-sectional findings that democratic institutions have a negligible direct effect on economic growth. We employ a newly constructed data-set of permanent democratic transitions during the so-called Third Wave of Democratization and examine the within effect of democratization in countries that abandoned autocracy and consolidated representative institutions. We study democratization in a before-after event study approach that enables us to control for time-invariant country-specific effects and general time trends. The panel estimates imply that on average democratizations are associated with a one half to one percent increase in annual per capita growth. The dynamic analysis also reveals a J-shaped growth pattern: during the transition growth is slow and on average negative; in the medium and especially long run, however, growth stabilizes at a higher level. The evidence supports "development" theories of democracy and growth that highlight the positive impact of representative institutions on economic activity. They also favour Friedrich Hayek (1960)'s idea that the merits of democracy appear in the long run. JEL Classification Nos.: O40, C30, E60.
Introduction
Leading politicians and commentators have argued that democratization will bring prosperity and growth into "pariah" and economically poorly performing countries. 1 Others, however, remain sceptical pointing to the mixed and inconclusive empirical evidence. The old debate dating back to Plato and Aristotle, on which political regime is socially and economically optimal arises again.
This debate is not purely academic and philosophical as it has important policy implications. In the last thirty years, the world has experienced an unprecedented move towards democratic institutions. that contrast with the previous, mainly cross-sectional, work. First, conditioning on time-invariant country characteristics and global shocks, a permanent democratization is associated with approximately a one half to one percent increment in annual real per capita GDP growth. Second, a dynamic J-shaped effect emerges with considerable (though not always significant) transition costs but sizable long-run gains. This parallels Bremmer's (2006) observation that "closed" societies that "open", they experience an initial period of instability.
Following the development of the empirical growth framework (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992), many authors have augmented a cross-country growth regression with various subjective measures of political freedom. An overall assessment of this literature suggests that democracy has an economically small and statistically insignificant effect on economic growth (see, for example, the reviews of Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Sirowi and Inkeles, 1990) . Parallel work has, however, established a strong link between the quality of institutions and long-run economic performance (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999) . Jointly this evidence therefore implies that while institutional enhancement significantly contributes to economic growth, democracy on its own seems to be immaterial. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) summarize this somewhat surprising result: "The relationship between democracy and economic success has been difficult to find in recent data."
The empirical work from which this conclusion is drawn has several drawbacks (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005, review the empirical growth literature and discuss the main findings and limitations).
First, previous work does not directly address whether a successful democratic transition is associated with higher growth. Rather, the literature utilizes the cross sectional variation to identify long-run patterns. Given, however, the policy question, we want to explore whether growth accelerates, declines or remains constant following the regime change. A related problem arises from omitted variables. Since a growth regression can only incorporate a limited number of independent variables, it is necessary to employ panel data techniques that control for omitted variables.
We therefore add country fixed effects that capture (part of) the unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. Focusing on the within-country effects of democratization enables us to account for time-invariant country characteristics such as geography, natural resources, social norms and colonization that may affect both growth and political development. 2 In addition we control for time trends and business cycle-dynamics. The main message of our analysis is that in contrast to the cross-country association, the "within" correlation between democracy and growth for countries that abandoned autocratic rule and established representative institutions is positive.
Second, although theory has called for a dynamic analysis, previous work has focused on unified correlations. The descriptive evolution of annual growth around the timing of democratization, given in Figure 1 , reveals an interesting pattern. Compared to the world average, annual output growth in democratization countries drops significantly during the transition; yet after the consolidation of representative institutions growth fluctuates at a higher rate. The graph suggests that in the short run there may be non-negligible transition costs, but in the long run growth stabilizes at higher rates. Note that taking a five or ten year average might obscure this information. We thus depart from the standard growth regression framework and employ static and dynamic panel data methodologies with annual frequency observations. 3 This enables us to quantify both the short and long-run correlations of political liberalization and growth. Friedrich Hayek (1960) eloquently summarized this point: "It is in its dynamic, rather than in its static, aspects that the value of 2 This is not to say that "fixed-effect" estimates are a panacea. Fixed-effects exacerbate problems arising from measurement error. Also, they do not solve the problem caused by the omission of relevant time-varying regressors. 3 Previous work has relied on cross-section or panel data techniques using 5 or 10 year period averages. See Attanasio et al. (2000) for a discussion on the merits of using annual observations rather than averages. Durlauf, et al. (2005) discuss some of the limitations of using high frequency data. In our framework the use of annual data is mandated by our research objective. democracy proves itself. As is true of liberty, the benefits of democracy will show themselves only in the long run, while its more immediate achievements may well be inferior to those of other forms of government." Our empirical results validate Hayek's intuition by showing that growth accelerates after a volatile transition period.
Third, there are serious concerns regarding measurement error. Classical error-in-variables yields attenuated estimates and reduces the economic significance of results. This problem is particularly relevant in studies of democracy, which "has meant different things to different people at different times and places" (Dahl, 2000, p.3) . The problem is even more severe in our context, since the various democracy measures tend to suffer from systematic biases (see Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) . Thus, most likely, measurement error does not take its usual classical form. There is now a considerable literature in political science that discusses the conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy. To address this caveat we utilize a newly constructed dataset of permanent democratic transitions in the 1960 − 2005 period (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2007) . While our binary (and trichotomous) measure might still suffer from misclassification in some cases, it enables us to more properly measure the effects of regime transitions. This paper is related to a new wave of research that studies how institutions affect economic performance (see for a review . From a methodological standpoint, the before-after within approach resembles analogous event-studies in macroeconomics. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) study the effect of trade liberalization, and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) the aftermath of financial liberalization on growth. Interestingly, a gap exists in studying the annual growth effects of a permanent democratic transition. In two parallel and independent papers Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006a) also explore the "within" effect of political reforms on growth. In addition, Roll and Talbott (2003) and Persson (2005) investigate the effect of democratic transitions on income, while Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) study interactions between political and economic reforms. Overall, these papers also provide positive within correlations between democracy and growth. Our work differs from these studies, however, in key aspects: First, these studies do not identify permanent democratic transitions systematically, but rather rely on ad-hoc cutoffs in political freedom indicators to spot regime changes. Second, our study aims to systematically explore the short, medium, and long-run effects of democratic transitions on growth, controlling for potential anticipation effects and the volatile transition period. Third, we explore whether moderate reforms compared to major ones are associated with growth gains. Fourth, our study focuses on the growth effects of lasting (rather than short-lived) democratic reforms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next Section outlines the theoretical arguments on how political liberalism affects growth and discusses previous empirical work. In Section 3 we lay down the benchmark difference-in-difference econometric specification and discuss the features of our data. Section 4 presents the main before-after results of the average "within" country growth effect of democratization. In Section 5 we turn to the dynamic analysis, studying the evolution of output during permanent democratic transitions. In Section 6 we give some further evidence and perform sensitivity checks. Section 7 concludes.
Theory and previous empirical evidence
For analytical purposes, we distinguish between theories that emphasize the negative consequences of democratic institutions on growth ("sceptical" theories) and those that stress positive aspects ("development" theories). In addition, we discuss theories arguing that development and democracy may be driven by common institutional factors.
"Sceptical" theories
"Sceptical" approaches emphasize the inefficiencies of representative government. Plato, de Tocqueville (1835) and Huntington (1968) feared populist demands for consumption and expropriation.
The "public choice" tradition (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) focused on the agency conflict between elected politicians and the public. For example, a democratic polity can yield inefficient outcomes by enabling various groups to compete for political influence. Besley and Coate (1998) synthesize a vast literature that models the distortions caused by incumbent politicians running excessive deficits to guarantee re-election. The endogenous fiscal policy literature models the interaction between the polity type, income inequality and economic performance. "Median-voter" models in the spirit of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) , show that high levels of income inequality raise the demand for redistribution. If fiscal policy and taxation are selected by majority voting, then high inequality will lead to high taxes, lower investment and consequently slower growth. This equilibrium, however, does not necessarily apply to non-democracies, since the "median voter" cannot enforce redistribution. 4 In line with this, Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that the negative correlation between inequality and growth is only present in democracies. Some proponents of the sceptical approach stress the need for a "strong state with an iron hand that neglects populist demands and enforces developmentalist policies with its insulation from particularistic pressures, particularly those originating from large firms and unions" (Rao, 1984) .
The economic success of the East Asian countries, which flourished under non-democratic regimes, offers an illustrative validation for this theoretical conjecture. The government in these countries neglected pressures for redistributive policies and safeguarded foreign investment (Rodrik, 2005a). Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) study the channels through which democracy influences growth and show that democracies are associated with low levels of private investment and high government spending, which in turn hurt economic success.
"Development" theories
"Development" theories of democratic rule stress how representative institutions contribute to growth. Many positive channels have been put forward: First, redistribution need not play a negative role. This occurs when taxation revenues are used to subsidize education (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993); Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) or mitigate capital market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993) . Second, democratic institutions can be more efficient by minimizing transaction costs of sociopolitical organization (Wittman, 1989) . Olson (1993) argued that the electoral process solves commitment issues, while Sen (1999) points out the superiority of democratic rule in gathering and transmitting information. North (1990) , summarizes this Coasian approach "...The institutional structure most favorable to approximate such conditions (efficient markets of the neoclassical model) is a modern democratic society with universal suffrage."
Probably the most widely known empirical finding in favour of the democratic process is Sen's observation that a famine has never occurred in a democratic society. Rodrik (1999) shows that democracies cope better with adverse economic shocks, while the Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) "channel" analysis reveals a positive growth effect of democracy through human capital. Democracies may be growth enhancing because they are associated with lower political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; and lower output volatility (Quinn and Woolley, 2001 ).
"Institutional" Theories
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2005, 2007) argue that colonial institutions influenced both economic and political development. They advocate that although democracy and income may well be mutually reinforcing, the strong correlation between the two is mainly driven by hard-toquantify variables related to colonial heritage and early institutions. Although our empirical model is estimated in changes (annual growth rates and abrupt changes in democracy), this conjecture highlights the importance to account with country fixed-effects for the impact of geography, the type of colonization or the identity of the colonizer.
Econometric Specification and Data

Estimation Strategy
Our analysis is based on the following regression equation:
The dependent variable is the annual log difference (g i,t ) in real per capita GDP in country i in year t. Country-fixed effects (α i ) and year fixed-effects (η t ) control for time-invariant country characteristics and global trends respectively. The vector X 0 i,t−1 includes time-varying covariates, such as investment, government spending, income, etc. The main variable of interest, Democ i,t , is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes the value one in the year a permanent democratization episode occurs and in all years following.
Regression (1) constitutes a difference-in-difference model, where democratization countries are the "treated" group, while non-reforming countries (always democratic, always autocratic and always in intermediate status) serve as the "control" group. Due to the inclusion of country and year fixed-effects the coefficient δ measures the annual growth effect of democratization in reforming countries compared to the general evolution of growth in non-reforming countries.
Difference-in-difference models are becoming increasingly popular in macroeconomics because they address many (though not all) limitations of standard cross-country growth regressions. Most importantly, the specification accounts for time-invariant country characteristics, such as geography, social norms and colonization that may influence both economic and political development (as advocated by institutional theories). In addition, most standard growth covariates, such as investment and education, exhibit little within country variation and thus do not usually affect the estimate on the reform variable. Furthermore, the model also accounts for common global trends.
There are two important concerns with the difference-in-difference specification in (1).
First, the unbiasedness of the estimator requires the strict exogeneity of the reform variable.
Although there is a strong association between income and democracy, this correlation almost vanishes in differences (see Acemoglu, et al. 2006) . Thus classical reverse causality, although it cannot be ruled out, is less of a concern in this context. Most importantly for establishing causality, the democratization variable should be random (see Rodrik, 2005b) . This (non-selectivity) assumption is quite restrictive because democratic reforms do not occur randomly, but are the outcome of a long process. How this might affect the estimates is unclear. If countries democratize when growth prospects are favourable, then the coefficient on the democratization indicator will be biased upwards, capturing the positive trend. If however in anticipation of the regime transition the economy starts investing before the political change, then the bias will be downwards. To account for this in Section 5 we estimate variants of (1), allowing for flexible time-varying effects of democratization on growth (Laporte and Windmeijer, 2005 ). An additional identifying assumption in (1) is that the same dynamics should govern the "treated" and the "control" group. Moreover conditional on country and year effects, the policy change measure (Democ i,t ) should be uncorrelated with other time-varying factors (that will be included in the error, v i,t ). We will thus control for time-varying observable factors, add regional trends and allow for income level differences. Yet, it should be stressed from the onset that in spite of the various model permutations and controls, it is quite hard to establish causality. For example democratization may foster growth by enhancing institutional quality and structural policies. Unfortunately detailed institutional indicators are only available for recent years and thus cannot formally explore (and control for) this possibility.
Second, difference-in-difference estimators exacerbate the downward bias in the standard errors arising from positive residual autocorrelation. Thus, in the static models we follow the solution proposed by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and adjust standard errors based on a generalized White-like formula, allowing for country-level clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We also estimate dynamic panel versions of (1) controlling for growth persistence and income level differences. Besides accounting for autocorrelation, this approach also enables us to quantify the short and the long-run effect of democratization on growth and income.
Before we discuss how we construct the reform variable it should be stressed that using a binary indicator entails both benefits and drawbacks. There has been an active debate in political science on whether one should treat democratic transitions as events using dichotomous indicators. Huntington (1993) and Przeworski et al. (2000) are proponents of using dichotomous measures, while Dahl (1971) and Bollen and Paxton (2000) favour finer measures. We believe, however, that given our research objective to estimate the dynamic evolution of annual growth during democratic transitions, the use of binary indicators is more appealing (this follows the "pragmatic approach" of Collier and Adcock, 1999; see also Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) . To account, however, for differences between democratic transitions we will also allow the effect of democratization to differ depending on the intensity of reforms.
Democratization Data
For the democratization indicator variable we construct a new dataset of permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the democratization that followed the collapse of communism in the early nineties. We detail our methodology in a companion paper (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2007) . Thus, here we only provide a brief description.
Our motivation to compile this dataset was the absence of a detailed coding of regime transitions. jumps from "not free" to either "partly free" or "free", and from "partly free" to "free".
Second, we examine numerous political archives, historical resources and election databases, to precisely identify the timing and characterize the nature of each transition. 5 The timing of democratization is either at the first "free and fair" elections or at the adoption of a new democratic constitution after a prolonged period of autocratic rule (typically the adoption of a new constitution and the elections take place within one or two years). Although there has been an active debate in political science on how to define democracy, free suffrage is in almost every definition we found. Third, we impose a five-year stability condition. As Huntington (1993) writes "...Stability is a central dimension in the analysis of any political system." We therefore ignore brief spikes in the political freedom indicators, since a careful investigation shows that they represent political instability rather than an actual transition. 6 Fourth, we distinguish between "full" and "partial" democratization episodes. We designate "full" status to countries where both the Polity indicator is greater than +7 and the FH status characterization is "free". All remaining democratization countries are recorded as "partial". 7 We examine political institutions in 174 countries over the 1960 − 2005 period. We code 39 incidents as "full" and 24 as "partial" democratizations. We also identify 6 episodes of small improvements in the level of political freedom ("borderline" democratization episodes). According to our coding only 3 countries experienced reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy. Finally we group the non-reforming countries into three categories, always democratic, always autocratic and always intermediate status. Table 1 gives the country, the year of the regime change and a brief historical description of the event in all reforming countries.
Other Data
The dependent variable is the annual log difference in real per capita GDP. The data come from 
Benchmark Estimates
We start by estimating the unconditional effect of political reforms on annual growth using static and dynamic panel models. Then we examine the effect of democratic reforms, controlling for standard growth covariates. Last, we compare the evidence using our event chronology with other 6 Examples of brief spikes in the two democracy indicators that clearly do not represent the establishment of representative institutions, include Nigeria (in the early eighties), Congo (in the early nineties), Burkina Faso (in [1978] [1979] , and Argentina (in the early seventies). A sample selection problem might arise if democratic transitions are more likely to be short-lived if growth is weak. Yet this problem is unlikely to plague our estimates since most democratic transitions that reversed back to autocracy were extremely short-lived. 7 Huntington ( approaches to identifying democratic transitions.
Unconditional Effects
Static Panel Models Table 2 , columns (1)- (4) report estimates of equation (1) using the maximum country sample (5, 410 observations; 166 countries for up to 43 years). The OLS specification in column (1) yields a small and statistically insignificant coefficient on democratization. This result is primarily driven by the cross country variation and, given the existing literature, comes at no surprise. In column (2) we control for global shocks adding time fixed-effects (η t ). The coefficient on the political liberalization indicator has increased to 0.50. Although the estimate is (marginally) insignificant (the p-value based on the clustered standard errors is 0.12), the time fixed-effects model shows that controlling for global trends is increasing the effect of democracy. A likely explanation is that during the sixties and early seventies, growth was globally higher than in the late seventies and eighties when the Third Wave began. In column (3) we isolate the within effect of democratization adding a vector of country dummies (α i ). The coefficient on democratization is more than four times larger than the OLS estimate (0.89) and statistically significant at the 10% level. The difference-in-difference coefficient in model (4) where we control for both country and year fixed-effects implies an even larger average growth effect of democratization of approximately 1.4%. The coefficient is now statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level. (5)- (8) we estimate autoregressive specifications, controlling for growth persistence and income differences. Although the joint presence of the country effects and the lagged dependent variable yields inconsistent estimates, the bias becomes negligible as the time dimension goes to infinity (Nickell, 1981) . Recent Monte Carlo studies show that the bias sharply decays when the time horizon exceeds 20 periods. Judson and Owen (1999) estimate that the bias on the lagged dependent variable is around 1 to 2 percent of the true coefficient value when T is 30 and between 2 and 3 percent when T is 20. More importantly, the bias on the other explanatory variables (and consequently the democratization dummy) becomes less than one percent. We thus exclude from our sample those countries with less than 20 time-series observations.
Dynamic Panel Models In columns
To further account for heterogeneity we also include region specific time trends (T j ). 8 The estimate on the indicator variable continues to be positive and significant when we control for growth persistence (column (5)) and when we also account for income (in (6)). A concern is whether the coefficient is picking up the market reforms that former socialist countries implemented in the nineties. Thus, in models (7) and (8) we drop these countries from the estimation. This is also a useful sensitivity check, since the data quality for socialist countries before 1990 is questionable.
The estimates imply a highly significant growth effect of democratization of more than 1 percent.
This significantly positive within effect of democratization on growth stands in contrast to the cross-sectional literature on political freedom and growth. The interpretation is, however, 
Conditional Effects
The empirical growth literature has considered numerous variables to explain cross-country growth differences. In Table 3 we report models that control for standard growth covariates, mainly to explore whether the effect of democratization documented in the unconditional models operates through capital accumulation or government and trade policies (In the Supplementary Appendix we plot the evolution of these variables in the years surrounding a successful democratic transition).
Following Bond et al. (2004) we estimate the following autoregressive distributed lag model:
To show that our results are not driven by the exact specification, we report estimates of a more parsimonious model, adding just one lag of annual per capita GDP growth and two lags of the control variables. This model also enables us to quantify the long-run effect of democratization on income. Examining whether democratization exerts a significantly positive effect on output level is a test of −δ/π > 0. 9 In spite of the rich lag specification, we might still not adequately capture growth persistence; thus in Table 3 we also report p-values based on standard errors that allow for panel-specific residual autocorrelation.
In column (1) we control for investment. The coefficient on democratization retains significance at the 1% level, implying an annual growth effect of 0.8%. Due to some inertia in the dependent variable, the long-run effect of democratization on annual growth is somewhat higher, around 1.0 − 1.2 percent. The estimated speed of convergence (4.2%) suggests a long-run effect of democratization on income level of approximately 18%.
In models (2) and (3) we control for human capital differences using average years of schooling and life expectancy at birth respectively. The coefficient on both human capital proxies is insignificant. Although this is not supportive to growth models stressing human capital, it is in line with panel studies revealing weak within correlations between schooling and growth (e.g. Krueger and Lindahl, 2001) . Most importantly, the coefficient on Democ i,t is three standard errors greater than zero and quite similar in magnitude to the unconditional estimates. Thus the effect of democratization does not seem to come through human capital, which in any case has a negligible impact on growth once we control for country fixed-effects.
In columns (4) and (5) we control for fiscal and trade policies respectively. Trade enters with a significantly positive estimate, while government consumption enters with a negative coefficient.
The coefficient on the political liberalization indicator is at least two standard errors above zero in both model perturbations. In column (6) we control jointly for all growth covariates. The estimated effect of democratization on growth continues to be highly significant, implying a short-run annual growth effect of 0.8%.
The models in Table 3 show that the effect of democratization on growth does not appear to work through capital accumulation or through sound fiscal/trade policies (which somewhat improve after the consolidation of democracy). This suggests that either these controls do not adequately capture the theoretical concepts of human capital, high spending, and trade or that besides the standard-documented channels democratization impacts growth through other mechanisms, notably institutional improvement. Unfortunately, we cannot say much more on the channels, since the usual control variables exhibit very small within variation. In addition some of the controls are contaminated by measurement error, which is magnified in (first or mean) differences.
expectancy, trade share, government consumption, and income indicate that these variables may be cointegrated with non-unique cointegrating vectors. Given the poor reliability of these tests, we present results from a range of specifications that are theoretically grounded and at the same time do not violate the time series properties of the corresponding processes.
Alternative Datasets
We now turn to alternative methods for identifying and timing democratic transitions. This enables us to compare our estimates with parallel work that also examines the within effect of democracy on growth and investigate the role of our democratization chronology.
Polity
Recent studies investigating the within effect of democracy rely on the composite Polity index Table) . The coverage is narrower since the Polity does not cover small countries. Compared to our chronology there are some differences, mainly, however, on the exact timing of reforms. For example using the Polity index Chile experienced a democratic transition in 1989, while according to our classification democratization occurred in March 1990 (when the first post-Pinochet Presidential Elections took place).
In Table 4 columns (1)- (4) we report estimates using the Polity-based democratization chronology. The OLS coefficient in model (1) is indistinguishable from zero; when we add country and year fixed-effects, however, the estimate turns highly significant (at the 1% level), implying an annual growth effect of 0.82% (column (2)). This supports our evidence that while in the cross-section there is no association between democracy and growth, the within correlation is positive and significant. The coefficient on the democratization indicator variable retains significance when we control for growth persistence and income in column (3) and when we control for all other growth covariates in column (4) (Model (3) is identical to specification (8) in Table 2 ; Model (4) is identical to specification (6) in Table 3 ). has its pros and cons). Taken jointly the results point out that while small and short-lived moves towards democratic rule are not necessarily followed by higher growth, lasting and sizable reforms are associated on average with significantly higher growth rates.
Freedom House
We next use the Freedom House (FH) database to identify democratic transitions. Using the FH measures to code regime transitions are far from ideal, since these move rather slowly; furthermore for many years most countries are classified in an intermediate "partially free" status. In addition Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Mainwaring et al. (2000) show that the FH method appears to be systematically biased against socialist regimes, left-wing governments, and countries not open to international trade. 10 We code a permanent regime change when the FH status characterization jumps from "Not Free" to either "Free" or "Partially Free" and from "Partially Free" to "Free".
We also require that the index remains at the new regime status for five years. In episodes of reverse transition the indicator equals one in the democratic period and zero in the non-democratic years. Table 4 , columns (5)- (8), reports estimates using the FH-based democratization classification.
The OLS estimate is small (0.17) and statistically insignificant. The within estimate, however, in model (6) is considerably larger (0.59), although only marginally significant (the p-value based on the clustered standard errors is 0.12). The dynamic specifications in columns (7) and (8) Table 4 , columns (9)- (12) report estimates using the Golder database, imposing as before a five-year stability condition. In line with our evidence so far, OLS yields a statistically insignificant and close to zero estimate (0.13). When we add country and time fixed-effects to isolate the within effect of democratic reforms on growth conditional on general global trends, the coefficient on democratization increases to 0.57. Although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level, this change shows that in contrast to the between correlation, the within correlation between democracy and growth is positive. The coefficient turns insignificant when we control for income level differences (column (11)) or other growth covariates (column (12)). The insignificant estimates, compared to ours or the Polity coding, are in line with measurement error yielding some attenuation.
Discussion
The results in Table 4 show why our estimates differ from previous work that primarily explored the between country variation. No matter which data-source we consider, the effect of democratization on growth is larger in the "within" models than in the simple OLS. When we use our democratic transition coding (Tables 2-3 
Timing of the Effect of Democratization
The association, however, between democratic transitions and growth might not be monotonic.
For example, in many countries democratization occurred during a crisis (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995) . Growth might be higher after the transition even in the absence of political reforms. We therefore need to control for the transition years and the recovery period, since this can yield an upward bias to the coefficient on democratization (this is similar to the Ashenfelter's dip critique in the program evaluation literature). To quantify the dynamic effects of democratization and control for lags or leads of the effect of reforms, we defined dummy ("pulse") variables for four, non-overlapping, three-year spaced periods around the transition and a dummy variable isolating the long-run effect of democratization. Our specification reads: Table 5 presents the results. In column (1) we report unconditional effects in the maximum sample. In columns (2)- (4) we control for growth persistence and income differences, excluding socialist countries (column (2)), countries with less than 20 yearly observations (column (3)) and both (column (4)). In column (5) we control for all growth covariates.
Anticipation and Transition The D 1 i,t indicator aims to account for potential positive effects of democratization before the transition. It is possible, for example, that firms and individuals start investing, because they can foresee the collapse of the authoritarian regime. In addition, the nondemocratically elected government may implement growth enhancing policies to gain legitimacy and stay in power. δ 1 is positive although statistically indistinguishable from zero in all models.
This suggests that anticipation effects, though possibly present, are not of primary importance.
Turning to the transition pulse variable D 2 i,t , we find inconclusive estimates. In column (1) δ 2 is negative and significant at the 5% level, implying some considerable regime transition costs of Long run Most importantly, Table 5 shows that democratizations seem to have sizable long-run benefits. The estimates on D 5 i,t , which quantifies the effect of democratization on growth after the post-seventh transition year are significant at standard confidence levels, implying a long-run democratization gain of approximately one extra percentage point at an annual basis. This result supports Hayek's (1960) idea that the merits of democracy will only come in the long run. It is also in line with the Persson and Tabellini (2006b) and Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno (2005) argument that countries experience higher growth as they accumulate democratic capital.
Discussion The results in Table 5 formalize the descriptive evidence in Figure 1 . Democratizations tend to occur during recessions and may coincide with the downturn of the business cycle.
There seems to be an immediate increase in growth performance after the transition. Then growth fluctuates for some years but, most importantly, after the consolidation of democracy (roughly after the fifth, sixth, and seventh post-transition year) growth stabilizes at a higher rate than the pre-transition period. Given, however, the limited number of transitions and the heterogeneity of regime changes the "pulse" variables are not very precisely estimated. In addition there are many ways to study growth dynamics with equation (3) . For example, if we were to compare the coefficients on the post-reform indicator variables (D 3 i,t , D 4 i,t and D 5 i,t ) with the pre reform dummy (D 1 i,t ) that equals one in the years just before the transition, then the differences are smaller (and in some models insignificant). This hints that after the consolidation of democracy, growth resumes back to peak of the business cycle under the autocratic rule.
6 Further Evidence-Sensitivity Checks
Full and Partial Democratic Reforms
Given the recent move to representative rule in many non-democratic countries, it is interesting to explore whether moderate reforms are associated with better performance. Figures 2a and   2b plot the evolution of (time-demeaned; i.e. accounting for time fixed-effects) growth around the democratic transition. This is done separately for the "full" and "partial" democratization group of countries. Figure 2b illustrates that countries that implemented partial reforms were experiencing below global mean annual growth rates before the transition; however, after switching to democracy these countries on average experienced higher growth rates than the rest of the world. The descriptives thus offer some optimism for countries that implement democratic reforms, even if these do not bring perfect protection of political freedom. In Table 6 we formally examine this question, allowing the effect of democratization to differ among "full" and "partial" reforming countries. Column (1) gives unconditional estimates in the maximum sample of countries and years (this model is comparable to Table 2 , column (4)). The coefficient on the "full" democratization indicator variable is 0.72, though only marginally significant (p-value based on clustered standard errors is 0.11). The coefficient on "partial" democratization is, however, highly significant (at the 1% level), indicating a large economic effect of almost 3%. This result resembles Barro's (1996, 1997) finding that growth accelerates when a country moves from total autocracy to intermediate levels of political freedom.
In model (2) we control for growth persistence and income differences, dropping from the estimation socialist countries and countries with less than 20 annual observations (this specification is comparable to Table 2 , column (8)). When we control for income-level convergence the coefficient on "full" dominates that for "partial" reforms. This result is robust to the inclusion of other growth covariates as shown in column (3) (this specification resembles that of Table 3 , model (6)).
Although this is in line with the pro-development evidence given so far, we need to note some important caveats: First, there are endogeneity concerns, since richer countries implemented larger reforms (like Chile or Portugal) while poorer nations only "partially" liberalized their polity (like Bangladesh or Zambia). Second, most "partial" reforms occurred in the nineties. Consequently we do not have enough post-reform observations. Third, given the conceptual challenges in defining democracy, the line of separation between "full" and "partial" democratizations is not always crystal-clear. Yet, acknowledging that in low-income countries democratic institutions maybe less likely to emerge and consolidate (e.g. Barro, 1999; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2004), we believe that these results provide some optimism for countries that implement moderate reforms.
All transitions
So far we have studied regime changes from autocracy to democracy. It is possible, however, that a reverse transition from democracy to autocracy might also yield growth gains, since countries abandon a regime if economic performance is poor. If growth accelerates after the transition from democracy to autocracy, then our previous results are challenged, since in this case a transition of any kind is associated with faster growth. To account for this in Table 6 columns (4)-(6) we augment the specification with an indicator variable that equals zero in the democratic years and one after the adverse regime transition from democracy to autocracy. We find few such (relatively stable) adverse reversals, namely Gambia, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe (one could also add Pakistan, Fiji, Somalia, and Sierra Leone). Thus the results should be interpreted cautiously. Yet in all specifications the coefficient on the reverse transition dummy is negative (and in some models significant). This suggests that countries that switched from democracy to autocracy did not experience higher growth rates. And if anything growth was slower in the autocratic period. This result reassures that our previous results were not driven by a general positive regime change effect and are line with previous and parallel work that autocratic transitions are associated with slower growth (Minier, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2006b ).
In columns (4)- (6) we add an indicator variable that equals one in the democratic years for those countries that implemented small democratic reforms, but which the level of political freedom and civil liberties is still low (borderline democratizations). The estimate on the borderline democratization indicator is positive, although statistically insignificant. Given the small number of observations (six countries, which mostly democratized in the mid-nineties; see Table 1 ), we cannot properly assess the effect of these small steps towards representative rule on growth. Yet the evidence shows that small reforms are not followed by slower growth.
Sample sensitivity check
For countries that democratized in the late nineties we do not have many post-reform observations to compare with the previous autocratic period. We thus re-estimated all models excluding countries with less than 10 post-reform observations (and alternatively placed these countries in the control group of non-reforming nations). Table 7 reports various specifications following this adjustment.
At the same time we continue to drop from the estimation socialist countries and countries with less than 20 annual observations. The results are similar to these reported previously. Models (1)- (3) show that the coefficient on the democratization dummy continues to be highly significant, suggesting an annual growth effect of approximately 0.75%. Models (4)-(6) yield similar estimates as those in Table 6 . When we do not control for income level differences (i.e. column (4)), the estimates reveal that both "full" and "partial" reforms are associated with significant growth gains, with partial reforms having a larger impact. When we control for income level, only the "full" democratization indicator enters with a significant point estimate.
Conclusion
The relationship between the type of polity and economic performance is among the oldest and most controversial topics in social science. Although there has been a burgeoning theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between political liberalism and economic performance, both the economics and the political science literature lack a comprehensive event analysis of the effects of democratization on growth. In this paper we analyze the evolution of growth before and after incidents of permanent democratic transitions. In contrast to the previous literature that examined the democracy-growth nexus with cross-sectional approaches, we explore the within-country growth effects of democratization. To quantify the effect of a successful democratization, we focus on countries that liberalized their polity during the so-called Third Wave of Democratization, using a newly constructed database of lasting political transition in the past forty years. Using annual frequency data and employing panel data techniques that control for unobserved country-specific characteristics and general time trends, we show that democratization leads to an almost one percent increase in real annual per capita GDP growth. Our analysis also reveals that during the transition growth drops substantially. Yet, after this transition it stabilizes at a higher rate. Figure 1 plots the evolution of time-demeaned (country growth rate minus the average growth rate for that year) average real per capita GDP growth in the ten years before and after a permanent democratic transition. Table 1 lists the democratization countries and gives a short description of the transition. T  T+1  T+2  T+3  T+4  T+5  T+6  T+7  T+8  T+9  T+10 Years around the democratic Transition (T*)
Real GDP p.c. growth (yearly demeaned)
Figures 2a and 2b plot the evolution of time-demeaned (country growth rate minus the average growth rate for that year) average real per capita GDP growth in the ten years before and after a "full" and a "partial" permanent democratic transition respectively. Table 1 lists the democratization countries and gives a short description of the transition. T  T+1  T+2  T+3  T+4  T+5  T+6  T+7  T+8  T+9 T  T+1  T+2  T+3  T+4  T+5  T+6  T+7  T+8  T+9  T+10 Years around the "full" democratic Transition (T*) Real GDP p.c. growth (yearly demeaned) New democratic constitution established a multi-party system. Free and fair legislative and presidential elections followed. Mexico (1997) For the first time since 1929 the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) lost the absolute power in the Lower House after the 1997 legislative elections. Mongolia (1993) New democratic constitution established a multi-party system. Panama (1994) Free and fair presidential and legislative elections after the US intervention. Peru (1980) Internationally declared free and fair legislative and presidential elections. Philippines (1987) Adoption of new democratic constitution; free and fair elections led to the overthrown of Marco's regime. Poland (1990) First post communism, free and fair, presidential, legislative and local elections. Adoption of new democratic constitution. Portugal (1976) Return to civilian rule after a long-lived military regime (since 1926). Romania (1990) First post communism free and fair elections. Sao Tome and Principe (1991) First post independence (in 1975), free and fair legislative and presidential elections. Senegal (2000) Free and fair elections and end of one-party ruling Slovak Republic (1993) Independence form Czechoslovakia. First post-communism elections; a new democratic constitution came into effect. Slovenia (1992) First since gaining independence from Yugoslavia, free presidential and legislative elections. Adoption of a new democratic constitution. South Africa (1994) First free elections with universal participation brought in power Nelson Mandela and ended the Apartheid regime. Spain (1978) New democratic constitution came into effect after Franco's death. Thailand (1992) Military was forced to step down. Free legislative elections followed. Uruguay (1985) Army returned the power to the democratically elected president. Free and fair elections Suriname (1991) Return to civilian government after a one-party regime; free and fair elections. Tanzania (1995) First post independence, internationally deemed free and fair elections. Turkey (1983) Fist free and fair legislative elections after a military dictatorship. Ukraine (1994) Independence from USSR. Legislative elections followed. Zambia (1991) First post independence, free and fair elections. New democratic constitution came into effect.
Panel C-"Borderline" Democratization Episodes
Country & Year Brief Description
Central African Republic (1993) First free election after the oppressive Bokassa rule. The 1996 presidential elections were deemed free, but marked by fraud allegations. Huge political instability is still present. Comoros (1990) Turmoil and short periods of democratic rule after 1990, deterioration after 1999 Iran, Islamic Republic of (1997) First multi-candidate elections were held. Political reforms took place, but basic civil rights and political liberties have not been fully granted. Nepal (1991) First free and fair elections since the early sixties. Niger (1999) Transition to civilian rule; presidential and legislative elections took place; although they were deemed free and fair, substantial political struggles are still present. Pakistan (1988) Legislative elections were held; restoration of the 1985 democratic constitution. In spite of free and fair elections in the nineties, the military coup of 1999 blocked democratization. Lebanon (1975) Since the 1975, tensions, fraud, foreign pressure and direct involvement in politics have marked elections. Zimbabwe (1987) 1987 Constitutional amendment increased the President's power resulting to fewer checks to the executive and questionable elections. Table 1 reports the country, timing and a brief description of the democratization events. Panel A reports "Full" democratization episodes; in these countries democratic institutions have been fully consolidated according to our identification and both the Polity and Freedom House indicators. Panel B reports "Partial" democratization episodes; in these countries a substantial democratic progress has occurred, but neither our approach nor the Freedom House and the Polity indicators record a perfect democracy level. Panel C gives "Borderline" democratization episodes; in these countries, democratic progress (reflected in both indices) has taken place, but protection level of civil liberties is still very low. Panel D gives "Reversals"; in these countries democratic rule followed by a coup or fraud elections. The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth of real per capita GDP. Democratization is an indicator variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a permanent democratic transition. Model (1) reports pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates in the maximum number of countries-years. Models (2), (4)- (8) include year constants. Models (3)- (8) include country constants. Models (5)- (8) include region-specific time trends (coefficients not reported). Models (5) and (7) control for growth inertia including two lags of the dependent variable. Models (6) and (8) also control for convergence including the three-year lagged log income level. Models (5)- (8) exclude countries with less than 20 observations of the dependent variable (to minimize the bias arising from the joint presence of country fixed-effects and the lagged dependent variable). Models (7) and (8) Table 3 reports autoregressive distributed lag specifications. The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth of real per capita GDP. Democratization is an indicator variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a permanent democratic transition. In all models we control for growth inertia including lagged growth and also control for convergence including the two-year lagged log income level. Model (1) controls for investment, including two-year lagged investment rate and contemporaneous and lagged differenced investment (coefficients not reported). Model (2) controls for human capital, including two-year lagged schooling and contemporaneous and lagged differenced schooling (coefficients not reported). Model (3) controls human capital-health, including two-year lagged life expectancy and contemporaneous and lagged differenced life expectancy (coefficients not reported). Model (4) controls for government spending, including two-year lagged government consumption and contemporaneous and lagged differenced government consumption (coefficients not reported). Model (5) controls for trade, including two-year lagged trade share and contemporaneous and lagged differenced trade share (coefficients not reported). Model (6) controls for lagged growth, two-year lagged income level, two-year lagged investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share. The model also includes contemporaneous and lagged differenced values of all the controls (coefficients not reported) The table reports a test and in parentheses p-values of the significance of: 1) the long-run effect of a permanent democratization on growth, 2) the long-run effect of a permanent democratization on output level.
OLS
All models include country-specific and year-specific constants and region-specific time trends (coefficients not reported). p-values based on general heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. The Table also reports p-values based on standard errors that allow for country-specific first-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth of real per capita GDP. Democratization is an indicator variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a permanent democratic transition. In columns (1)- (4) we identify democratic transitions using the median value of the Polity composite democracy index. In columns (5)- (8) we identify democratic transitions using the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties measures. In columns (9)- (12) we identify democratic transitions using the Golder (2005) chronology. See the text for more details. The Supplementary Appendix Table reports the regime characterization according to each of these three methods for all sample countries.
Models (1), (5), and (9) report pooled cross-sectional time-series OLS estimates. All other models include country and year fixed-effects (coefficients not reported). Models (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12) include regionspecific time trends (coefficients not reported). Estimation is performed in all but socialist countries. Models (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12) also exclude countries with less than 20 observations of the dependent variable (to minimize the bias arising from the joint presence of country fixed-effects and the lagged dependent variable). Models (3), (7), and (9) control for growth inertia and convergence, including two lags of the dependen variable and the three-year lagged log income level (these models are analogous to model (8)- Table 2 ). Models (4), (8) , and (12) control for lagged growth, two-year lagged log income level, two-year lagged investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share. The models also include contemporaneous and lagged differenced values of all the controls (these models are analogous to model (6)- Table 3 ). pvalues based on general heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered by country standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. p-values based on general heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered by country standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth of real per capita GDP. D1 is a dummy ("pulse") variable that takes on the value one in the fifth, fourth, and third pre democratization year and zero otherwise. D2 is a dummy ("pulse") variable that takes on the value one in the second, first predemocratization year and on the transition year and zero otherwise. D3 is a dummy ("pulse") variable that takes on the value one in the first, second and third post democratization year and zero otherwise. D4 is a dummy ("pulse") variable that takes on the value one in the fourth, fifth, and sixth post democratization year and zero otherwise. D5 is a dummy variable that takes the value one in the seventh and all subsequent (eighth, ninth, etc.) post democratization year and zero otherwise. All models include country and year fixed-effects (constants not reported).
Models (2)-(5) also include region-specific time trends (coefficients not reported). Models (2), (3), and (4) control for growth inertia and convergence, including two lags of the dependent variable and the three-year lagged log income level. Model (6) controls for lagged growth, two-yea lagged log income level, two-year lagged investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share. The model also include contemporaneous and lagged differenced values of all the controls (these models are analogous to model (6)- Table 3 ). p-values based on general heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered by country standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
All Types of Transitions
The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth of real per capita GDP. Full Democratization is an indicator variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a "full" democratic transition (Panel A- Table 1 ). Partial Democratization is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a "partial" democratic transition (Panel B- Table 1 ). Borderline Democratization is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a "borderline" democratic transition (Panel C- Table 1 ). Reverse Transition is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent years in countries that experienced a reverse transition from relatively stable democracy to non-democratic rule (Panel D- Table 1 ). All models include country and year fixed-effects. Models (2), (3), (5), and (6) also include region-specific time trends (coefficients not reported).
Table 6: Democratization and Intensity of Reforms
Models (1) and (4) report unconditional estimates in the maximum number of countries. Models (2) and (5) control for growth inertia and convergence, including two lags of the dependent variable and the three-year lagged log income level (these models are analogous to model (8)- Table 2 ). Models (3) and (6) control for lagged growth, two-year lagged log income level, two-year lagged investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share. The models also include contemporaneous and lagged differenced values of all the controls (these models are analogous to model (6)- Table 3 ). Models (2), (3), (5), and (6) exclude countries with less than 20 observations (to minimize the bias arising from the joint presence of country fixed-effects and the lagged dependent variable).
Intensity of Reforms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth of real per capita GDP. In columns (1)- (3) Democratization is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a permanent democratic transition. In columns (4)-(6), Full Democratization is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a "full" democratic transition (Panel A- Table 1 ). Partial Democratization is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a "partial" democratic transition (Panel B- Table 1 ). Borderline Democratization is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent post democratization years in countries that experienced a "borderline" democratic transition (Panel C- Table 1 ). Reverse Transition is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on the value one in the year and all subsequent years in countries that experienced a reverse transition from relatively stable democracy to stable non-democratic rule (Panel D- Table 1 ).
Table 7: Further Sensitivity Checks
In the estimation we exclude socialist nations, countries with less than 20 observations of the dependent variable, and reforming countries with less than 10 post democratization observations. All models include country and year fixed-effects (constants not reported). Models (2), (3), (5), and (6) also include region-specific time trends (coefficients not reported). Models (1) and (4) report unconditional estimates. Models (2) and (5) control for growth inertia and convergence, including two lags of the dependent variable and the three-year lagged log income level (these models are analogous to model (8)- Table 2 ). Models (3) and (6) control for lagged growth, two-year lagged log income level, two-year lagged investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share. The models also include contemporaneous and lagged differenced values of all the controls (these models are analogous to model (6)- Table 3 ). p-values based on general heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered by country standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
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